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Abstract—In this paper, we address the problem of optimal
power allocation at the relay in two-hop secure communications
under practical conditions. To guarantee secure communication
during the long-distance transmission, the massive MIMO (M-
MIMO) relaying techniques are explored to significantly enhance
wireless security. The focus of this paper is on the analysis and
design of optimal power assignment for a decode-and-forward
(DF) M-MIMO relay, so as to maximize the secrecy outage
capacity and minimize the interception probability, respectively.
Our study reveals the condition for a nonnegative the secrecy
outage capacity, obtains closed-form expressions for optimal
power, and presents the asymptotic characteristics of secrecy
performance. Finally, simulation results validate the effectiveness
of the proposed schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The open nature of the wireless channel facilitates a mul-
tiuser transmission, but also incurs the security problem. Re-
cently, as a complement of traditional upper-layer encryption
techniques, physical layer security (PHY-security) has been
proposed to realize secure communications by making use of
the characteristics of wireless channels, i.e., noise, fading and
interference [1].
From an information-theoretic viewpoint, the performance
of PHY-security is determined by the rate difference be-
tween the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper channel
[2] [3]. Therefore, to enhance wireless security, it makes
sense to simultaneously increase the legitimate channel rate
and decrease the eavesdropper channel rate. Inspired by this,
various physical layer techniques have been introduced to
improve the secrecy performance. Wherein, MIMO relaying
technique gains considerable attention due to the following
two reasons. First, the relay can provide a diversity gain
and shorten the accessing distance, and thus improve the
secrecy performance [4]. Second, MIMO techniques, such as
spatial beamforming, can reduce the information leakage to
the eavesdropper [5]. The beamforming schemes at the MIMO
relay based on amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-
forward (DF) relaying protocols were presented in [6] and
[7], respectively. It is worth pointing out that the optimal beam
design at the relay requires global channel state information
(CSI) [8]. Yet, the CSI, especially eavesdropper CSI is difficult
to obtain, since the eavesdropper is usually passive and keeps
silent. Therefore, it is impossible to realize absolutely secure
communications over fading channels. In this context, statisti-
cal secrecy performance metrics, e.g., secrecy outage capacity
and interception probability, are adopted to evaluate wireless
security [9].
Recently, an advanced MIMO relaying technology, namely
massive MIMO (M-MIMO) relaying, is introduced into secure
communications to further improve the secrecy performance
[10]. Even without eavesdropper CSI, M-MIMO relaying can
generate a very high-resolution spatial beam, and thus the
information leakage to the eavesdropper is quite small. More
importantly, the secrecy performance can be enhanced by
simply adding more antennas. Hence, the challenging issue
of short-distance interception in secure communications can
be well solved. Note that in two-hop secure communications,
the transmit power at the relay has a great impact on the
secrecy performance, since it affects the signal quality at
both the destination and the eavesdropper. An optimal power
allocation scheme for a multi-carrier two-hop single-antenna
relaying network was given in [11] by maximizing the sum
secrecy rate. However, the power allocation for a multi-antenna
relay, especially an M-MIMO relay, is still an open issue. In
this paper, we focus on power allocation for DF M-MIMO
secure relaying systems under very practical assumptions,
i.e., no eavesdropper CSI and imperfect legitimate CSI. The
contributions of this paper are three-fold:
1) We reveal the relation between the secrecy outage capac-
ity and a defined relative distance-dependent path loss,
and then derive the condition for a nonnegative secrecy
outage capacity and the constraint on the minimum
number of antennas.
2) We derive closed-form expressions for the optimal
power at the relay in the sense of maximizing the
secrecy outage capacity and minimizing the interception
probability, respectively.
3) We present clear insights into the secrecy performance
through asymptotic analysis. We show that the maximum
secrecy outage capacity is an increasing function of the
source power while the minimum interception probabil-
ity keeps constant.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first
give an overview of the DF M-MIMO secure relaying system
in Section II, and then derive two optimal power allocation
schemes for the relay in Section III. In Section IV, we present
simulation results to validate the effectiveness of the proposed
schemes. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a time division duplex (TDD) two-hop massive
MIMO (M-MIMO) relaying system, where a single antenna
source transmits message to a single antenna destination with
the aid of a relay with NR antennas, while a passive single
antenna eavesdropper intends to intercept the information.
Note that the number of antennas at the relay in such an M-
MIMO relaying system is quite large, i.e., NR = 100 or even
bigger. It is assumed that there is no direct transmission be-
tween the source and the destination due to a long propagation
distance. The relay system works in a half-duplex mode, which
means any successful transmission requires two time slots.
Specifically, the source sends the signal to the relay in the
first time slot, and then the relay forwards the post-processing
signal to the destination in the second time slot. In this paper,
we assume the eavesdropper is far from the source and close
to the relay, since it was concluded that the signal comes from
the relay directly. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
eavesdropper only monitors the transmission from the relay to
the destination.
We use √αS,RhS,R, √αR,DhR,D and √αR,EhR,E to rep-
resent the channels from the source to the relay, the relay to
the destination, and the relay to the eavesdropper, respectively,
where αS,R, αR,D and αR,E are the distance-dependent path
losses and hS,R, hR,D , and hR,E denote the channel fading
coefficient vectors with independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) zero mean and unit variance complex Gaussian entries.
It is assumed that the channels remain constant during a time
slot and fade independently over slots. Thus, the received
signal at the relay in the first time slot can be expressed as
yR =
√
PSαS,RhS,Rs+ nR, (1)
where s is the normalized Gaussian distributed transmit sym-
bol, PS is the transmit power at the source, and nR stands
for the additive white Gaussian noise with unit variance at the
relay. We assume that the relay has perfect CSI about hS,R
by channel estimation. Then, maximum ratio combination
(MRC) decoding is performed to recover the information.
Specifically, the received signal is multiplied by a vector
wR = hHS,R/‖hS,R‖.
During the second time slot, the relay forwards the decoded
signal sˆ through maximum ratio transmission (MRT). We
assume that the relay has partial CSI about hR,D due to
channel reciprocity impairment in TDD systems. The relation
between the estimated CSI hˆR,D and the real CSI hR,D is
given by
hR,D =
√
ρhˆR,D +
√
1− ρe, (2)
where e is the error vector with i.i.d. zero mean and unit
variance complex Gaussian entries, and is independent of
hˆR,D. ρ, scaling from 0 to 1, is the correlation coefficient
between hˆR,D and hR,D . Thus, the received signals at the
destination and the eavesdropper are given by
yD =
√
PRαR,DhHR,Dr + nD, (3)
and
yE =
√
PRαR,EhHR,Er + nE , (4)
respectively, where PR is the transmit power of the relay, r =
vRsˆ is the forwarded signal with vR = hˆR,D/‖hˆR,D‖ being
a MRT beamforming vector. nD and nE are additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) samples with unit variance at the
destination and the eavesdropper, respectively.
III. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, we aim to optimize the secrecy performance
through allocating the relay power PR, since it affects the
signal quality at both the destination and the eavesdropper.
In what follows, we analyze and design the power allocation
schemes in the sense of maximizing the secrecy outage capac-
ity and minimizing the interception probability, respectively.
A. Secrecy Outage Capacity Maximization Power Allocation
Based on the received signal in (1), when performing MRC
decoding at the relay, the channel capacity from the source to
the relay can be expressed as
CS,R = W log2(1 + γR), (5)
where W is the spectral bandwidth and γR = PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2
is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Similarly, according to (3)
and (4), channel capacities from the relay to the destination
and from the relay to the eavesdropper are given by
CR,D = W log2 (1 + γD) , (6)
and
CR,E = W log2 (1 + γE) , (7)
respectively, where γD = PRαR,D
∣∣∣hHR,D hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2 and γE =
PRαR,E
∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2.
Then, for the secrecy outage capacity in a DF M-MIMO
secrecy relaying system, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1: Given an outage probability bound by ε,
the secrecy outage capacity is approximated as Csoc =
W log2 (1 + min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR)) − W log2(1 −
PRαR,E ln ε), when the number of relay antennas is large.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix I.
Note that the secrecy outage capacity may be negative from
a pure mathematical view. Hence, it makes sense to find the
condition that the secrecy outage capacity is nonnegative.
For notional simplicity, we let ραR,DNR =
A,−αR,E ln ε = A · rl, PSαS,RNR = B, where
rl = − αR,E ln εραR,DNR is defined as the relative distance-dependent
path loss. Then, the secrecy outage capacity can be rewritten
as
Csoc =
{
W log2(1 +B)−W log2(1 + PRArl), B < PRA
W log2(1 + PRA)−W log2(1 + PRArl), B ≥ PRA
Observing the above secrecy outage capacity, we get the
following theorem:
Theorem 2: If and only if 0 < rl < 1, the secrecy outage
capacity in such a DF M-MIMO secure relaying system in
presence of imperfect CSI is nonnegative.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix II.
Notice that 0 < rl < 1 is the precondition for power
allocation in such a secure relaying system. Given channel
conditions and outage probability requirements, in order to
fulfill 0 < rl < 1, the number of antennas NR must be bigger
than −αR,E ln εραR,D . For an M-MIMO relaying system, it is always
possible to meet the condition of 0 < rl < 1 by adding more
antennas, which is one of its main advantages. In what follows,
we only consider the case of 0 < rl < 1.
Based on Theorem 1, the secrecy outage capacity max-
imization power allocation is equivalent to the following
optimization problem:
J1 : max
PR
Csoc
s.t. PR ≤ Pmax, (8)
where Pmax is the transmit power constraint at the relay.
For the optimal solution of the above optimization problem,
we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3: The optimal power at the relay
is P ⋆R = min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)
, and the corre-
sponding maximum secrecy outage capacity is
Cmaxsoc = W log2
(
1 + min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)
A
)
−
W log2
(
1 + min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)
Arl
)
.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix III.
Remark: It is found that when eavesdropper CSI is unavail-
able, it is optimal for the DF secure relaying system to let
the two hops have the same channel capacity, resulting in
P ⋆R = min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)
.
B. Interception Probability Minimization Power Allocation
In this subsection, we analyze the optimal power allocation
from the perspective of minimizing the interception proba-
bility. In general, interception probability is defined as the
probability of information leakage, namely the probability of
CD < CE . Then, interception probability is equivalent to the
secrecy outage probability when Csoc = 0 in (18). Thus, it
can be computed as
P0 = exp
(
−2
CD/W − 1
PRαR,E
)
, (9)
where CD =W log2 (1 + min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR)) is
the legitimate channel capacity.
Then, interception probability minimization power alloca-
tion can be described as the following optimization problem:
J2 : min
PR
P0
s.t. PR ≤ Pmax. (10)
Since exp(x) is a monotonously increasing function of x
and minx(−f(x)) is equivalent to maxx(f(x)), J2 can be
transformed to the following problem:
J3 : max
PR
min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR)
PRαR,E
s.t. PR ≤ Pmax. (11)
By solving the above optimization problem, we have the
following theorem:
Theorem 4: From the perspective of minimizing inter-
ception probability, the optimal transmit power at the relay
P ⋆R belongs to a region
(
0,min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)]
, and the
corresponding minimum interception probability is Pmin0 =
exp
(
− ραR,DNRαR,E
)
.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix IV.
Remarks: It is found that the optimal power minimizing
the interception probability is not unique. However, from
the perspective of maximizing the secrecy outage capacity,
PR = min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)
, namely the upper bound, is
optimal. Thus, it is better to let P ⋆R = min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)
in the sense of jointly optimizing interception probability and
secrecy outage capacity.
C. Asymptotic Characteristic
In the above, we prove that the optimal relay power P ⋆R
in the sense of maximizing the secrecy outage capacity and
minimizing the interception probability is a function of the
source power PS . Thus, the source power has a great impact
on the secrecy performance, as described in Theorem 3 and 4.
In order to get some clear insights, we carry out an asymptotic
performance analysis with respect to the source power.
First, for the secrecy outage capacity in a DF M-MIMO
secrecy relaying system, there are the following asymptotic
characteristics:
Proposition 1: In the low PS regime, the optimal relay
power P ∗R and maximum secrecy outage capacity Cmaxsoc
asymptotically approach zero. In the high PS regime, the
maximum secrecy outage capacity will be saturated and is in-
dependent of PS . Furthermore, Cmaxsoc is an increasing function
of PS .
Proof: In the low PS regime, the optimal relay power
and the corresponding secrecy outage capacity are reduced
as P ⋆R =
PSαS,R
ραR,D
and Cmaxsoc = W log2
(
1+PSαS,RNR
1+PSαS,RNRrl
)
,
respectively. Both of them asymptotically approach zero as PS
tends to zero. Otherwise, in the high PS regime, the optimal
relay power is limited by Pmax, then Cmaxsoc is constant. In
other words, the secrecy outage capacity becomes saturated.
In addition, because of 0 < rl < 1, Cmaxsoc is an increasing
function of PS .
Second, for the interception probability, we have the fol-
lowing asymptotic characteristics:
Proposition 2: The minimum interception probability is
independent of PS .
Proof: As proved in Theorem 4, although the optimal
relay power is a function of the source power, the final
interception probability is a constant independent of PS and
PR.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
To examine the effectiveness of the proposed power alloca-
tion schemes for DF M-MIMO secure relaying systems, we
present several simulation results for the following scenarios.
We set NR = 100, W = 10 kHz, ρ = 0.9 and ε =
0.01 without extra statements. For convenience, we normalize
the path loss from the source to the relay as αS,R = 1
and use αR,D and αS,E to denote the relative path loss.
Specifically, αR,E > αR,D means that the eavesdropper is
closer to the relay than the destination. In addition, we use
SNRS = 10 log10 PS , SNRR = 10 log10 PR and SNRmax =
10 log10 Pmax to represent the SNR in dB at the source, the
relay and the constraint at the relay, respectively.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of theoretical and simulation results with different outage
probability requirements.
First, we verify the accuracy of the theoretical expression in
Theorem 1 with SNRS = SNRR = 10 dB and αR,D = 1. As
seen in Fig. 1, the theoretical results are well consistent with
the simulations in the whole αR,E region with different outage
probability requirements, which proves the high accuracy of
the derived results. Given an outage probability bound by
ε, as αR,E increases, the secrecy outage capacity decreases
gradually. This is because the interception ability of the
eavesdropper enhances due to the short interception distance.
In addition, for a given αR,E , the secrecy outage capacity
improves with the increase of ε, since the outage probability
is an increasing function of the secrecy outage capacity.
Next, we show the performance gain of the proposed
optimal power allocation schemes compared to a fixed power
allocation with SNRS = 10 dB, SNRmax = 15 dB and
αR,E = 5. It is worth pointing out that the fixed scheme uses a
fixed power PR = 15 dB regardless of channel conditions and
system parameters. As seen in Fig. 2, the secrecy outage capac-
ity maximization power allocation scheme performs better than
the fixed power allocation scheme. Especially in the high αR,D
regime, the performance of the proposed scheme improves
sharply, while that of the fixed allocation scheme nearly
remains unchanged. This is because the legitimate channel
capacity is limited by the source-relay channel capacity under
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this condition, but the fixed scheme is regardless of αS,R and
PS . In the low αR,D regime, the secrecy outage capacities of
both schemes approach zero due to rl > 1, which verifies
Theorem 2 again. In terms of interception probability, as
shown in Fig. 3, the proposed scheme also outperforms the
fixed power allocation scheme. Consistent with the theoretical
claims, the interception probability approaches zero when
αR,D is large enough.
Finally, we check the asymptotic characteristics with
αR,D = 1. As shown in Fig. 4, as PS tends to zero, the max-
imum secrecy capacities with different αR,E approach zero.
In the large PS regime, the maximum secrecy outage capacity
will be saturated, which is in agreement with Proposition 1
again. From Fig. 5, it is seen that the minimum interception
probability is independent of PS . Additionally, the interception
probability floor becomes higher with the increase of αR,E .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have first presented a secrecy perfor-
mance analysis for a DF M-MIMO secure relaying system
with imperfect CSI. We proved that in order to guarantee
a nonnegative secrecy outage capacity, there is a constraint
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on the minimum number of antennas at the relay. Then, by
maximizing the secrecy outage capacity and minimizing the
interception probability, we proposed two optimal relay power
allocation schemes. At last, we revealed the asymptotic char-
acteristics of maximum secrecy outage capacity and minimum
interception probability with respect to the source power.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on channel capacities from the source to the relay in
(5) and from the relay to the destination in (6), the legitimate
channel capacity can be computed as
CD = min(CS,R, CR,D), (12)
= min
(
W log2
(
1 + PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2
)
,
W log2
(
1 + PRαR,D
∣∣∣hHR,D hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2
))
= min
(
W log2(1 + PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2),W log2
(
1 +
PRαR,D
∣∣∣(√ρhˆHR,D +√1− ρeH) hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2)
)
(13)
= min
(
W log2(1 + PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2),W log2
(
1 +
PRαR,D(ρ‖hˆR,D‖2 + 2
√
(1− ρ)ρR(eH hˆR,D)
+(1− ρ)‖eH hˆR,D‖/‖hˆR,D‖2)
))
≈ min
(
W log2(1 + PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2),
W log2(1 + PRαR,Dρ‖hˆR,D‖2)
)
(14)
≈ W log2(1 + min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR)). (15)
whereR(x) denotes the real part of x. hR,D has been replaced
with √ρhˆR,D +
√
1− ρe in (13). Eq. (14) follows from the
fact that ρ‖hˆR,D‖2 scales with the orderO(ρNR) as NR →∞
while 2
√
ρ(1 − ρ)R(eH hˆR,D)+(1−ρ)‖eH hˆHR,D‖2/‖hˆR,D‖2
scales as the order O(1), which is negligible. Eq. (15) holds
true because of lim
NR→∞
‖hˆR,D‖2
NR
= 1 and lim
NR→∞
‖hS,R‖2
NR
= 1,
namely channel hardening [12].
Similarly, the eavesdropper channel capacity is given by
CE = W log2(1+min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,E
∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2)).
(16)
Then, the secrecy outage probability ε with respect to a
secrecy outage capacity CSOC can be computed as (18) at
the top of next page, where (17) follows from the fact that∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2 is χ2 distributed with 2 degrees of freedom,
and (18) holds true since exp
(
−PSαS,RNRPRαR,E
)
approaches zero
when NR is sufficient large. Based on (18), it is easy to get
the Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Based on the secrecy outage capacity in Theorem 1, when
PR ≥ PSαS,RραR,D , we have Csoc = W log2(1 + PSαS,RNR) −
W log2(1 + PRραR,DNRrl). To guarantee Csoc ≥ 0, the
following condition PSαS,RNR ≥ PRραR,DNRrl must be
fulfilled, which is equivalent to 0 < rl < 1 in the case of
PR >
PSαS,R
ραR,D
.
Otherwise, when PR ≤ PSαS,RραR,D , the secrecy outage ca-
pacity is changed as Csoc = W log2(1 + PRραR,DNR) −
W log2 (1 + PRραR,DNRrl). Only when 0 < rl < 1, Csoc is
nonnegative.
Above all, 0 < rl < 1 or NR > −αR,E ln εραR,D is the
precondition that the nonnegative secrecy outage capacity
exists. Therefore, we get the Theorem 2.
ε = Pr(Csoc > CD − CE)
= Pr

min

PSαS,RNR, PRαR,E
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 > 2(CD−Csoc)/W − 1


= Pr

PSαS,RNR ≤ PRαR,E
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2

Pr (PSαS,RNR > 2(CD−Csoc)/W − 1)
+Pr

PSαS,RNR > PRαR,E
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2

Pr

PRαR,E
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
> 2(CD−Csoc)/W − 1


= exp
(
−PSαS,RNR
PRαR,E
)
+
(
1− exp
(
−PSαS,RNR
PRαR,E
))
exp
(
−2
(CD−Csoc)/W − 1
PRαR,E
)
(17)
≈ exp
(
−2
(CD−Csoc)/W − 1
PRαR,E
)
. (18)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
According to the Theorem 1, when PR ≥ PSαS,RραR,D , the
secrecy outage capacity Csoc = W log2(1 + PSαS,RNR) −
W log2(1 + PRραR,DNRrl) is maximized when PR =
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, since Csoc is a monotonously decreasing function of
PR.
When PR ≤ PSαS,RραR,D , the secrecy outage capacity Csoc =
W log2(1 + PRραR,DNR) −W log2(1 + PRραR,DNRrl) is
an increasing function of PR under the condition 0 < rl < 1.
Thus, PR = PSαS,RραR,D is the optimal power at the relay.
Considering the constraint on the transmit power Pmax
at the relay, the optimal power at the relay is P ⋆R =
min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)
. Furthermore, by substituting P ⋆R =
min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)
into the expression of secrecy outage
capacity, we can obtain the maximum secrecy outage capacity
as shown in Theorem 3.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
First, when PR ≤ PSαS,RραR,D , the optimization problem J3 is
equivalent to
G1 : max
PR
αR,DρNR
αR,E
s.t. PR ≤ min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)
. (19)
Interestingly, it is found that the objective function ραR,DNRαR,E
is independent of PR. Hence, the optimal solution of G1 can
be an arbitrary value belonging to
(
0,min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)]
.
Second, when PR ≥ PSαS,RραR,D , the optimization problem J3
is reduced as
G2 : max
PR
PSαS,RNR
PRαR,E
s.t.
PSαS,R
ραR,D
≤ PR ≤ Pmax. (20)
The optimal solution of G2 is PSαS,RραR,D , since the objective
function is a decreasing function of PR.
Thus, the optimal transmit power at the relay is P ⋆R =(
0,min
(
PSαS,R
ραR,D
, Pmax
)]
. Hence, we get the Theorem 4.
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